Ford Foundation and Social Control

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Ford Foundation and Social Control

by Peter Seybold

‘Science for the People’ Vol. 14, No. 3, May-June 1982, p. 28 – 31

Peter Seybold teaches Sociology at the University of Wisconsin–Parkside, Kenosha, Wisconsin, He authored “The Ford Foundation and The Triumph of Behavioralism in American Political Science, ” in Robert Arnove (ed.), Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundation at Home and Abroad (1980), and is currently writing a book on the influence of the Ford Foundation on American Political Sociology. 

The current structure of public policy and social science research owes a great deal to the events of the 1950s, and to the key role played by the Ford Foundation. It was during this period that the Foundation quickly rose to be the largest and most influential private philanthropic foundation. One can hardly discover a field of academic research in the social sciences or a major social policy question in the 1950s which does not bear the mark of its influence. Its powerful force in shaping public policy and redirecting academic social science research has had a lasting effect. 

The “Legitimation Crisis” and Social Unrest 

In the decade following World War II the United States faced many new challenges, particularly problems of “social control” such as industrial strife, civil rights, and questions of legitimacy. While many of these problems were in their embryonic stages, uneasiness about the level of social disorganization and memories of the upheavals of the Great Depression were still quite apparent. At any one moment one of these problems might generate widescale political protest which could shake an already fragile base of legitimation. From the perspective of the U.S. elite it was essential that conflict and discord be minimized and stability restored.

Illustration of bottle with label ‘Ford’s CUREALL’. The text around the bottle: “Try…Doctor Ford’s Cure-All for Civil Strife”; “Contains: Pragmatism, ‘Blame the Victim’ Approaches, A Host of Theories That Obscure the Class Nature of Society'
Illustration by Beverly Chorbajian

Thus it was that the Ford Foundation embarked on an ambitious program of economic control of the behavioral sciences, particularly behavioral political sociology. The Foundation’s guiding influence was its 1949 Study Committee Report, which focused in large part on the widespread questioning of the electoral process and the fear of mass discontent. The 1948 Presidential election drew just 51.4% of the eligible voters, and according to the 1949 Report it was “the belief of a number of Americans that the principles of democracy are a collection of cliches.” There therefore arose a “struggle of thoughtful and informed persons to find a meaningful, contemporary, and usable definition of democracy.” It was here that the Ford Foundation saw its role in maintaining the status quo: “The processes of government are seriously affected by public apathy and lack of citizen participation. Research will be required to analyze public apathy in order to understand its causes and the ways which it may be lessened.”1

It came to be believed that the most general problem which confronted ruling class members was this “legitimation crisis.” It would therefore be necessary not only to strengthen the image of democracy, but also to provide at least some preliminary remedies to pressing social problems. At stake was the possibility that elite concessions would have to be made to a defiant poor. The Foundation set out to develop sophisticated methods to analyze electoral behavior and to judge the level and form of political protest in the U.S., along with strategies to structure that protest. The task was to promote a better understanding of the system by defining new social norms and to alleviate anomie2 and social disorganization by practical community programs. 

The Foundation during this period sought to dominate the social outlook by defining the scope of community reform programs and by setting the tone for academic research in social science. In short, it tried to establish hegemony over community and research efforts to confront these issues. A prominent example of this two-pronged approach was the Foundation’s extensive involvement with urban problems. Decay of the cities and irrationalities of city government started to become visible in the 1950s. The Foundation responded by supporting research centers on metropolitan politics, graduate school training focused on metropolitan government, and a number of practical civic programs (Great Cities Improvement Program, Community Development Program–Gray Areas Projects, Mobilization for Youth, etc.). 

Transforming Political Science 

While ameliorative social programs were an important part of Foundation strategy, the trustees also believed that in order to design programs which would work on the community level it was essential to develop a better understanding of human behavior. For this reason the Behavioral Sciences Division (1951-1957) was created within the Ford Foundation. 

From its beginning the Behavioral Science Division focused on practical solutions to problems identified by the 1949 study: problems of low voter turnout and the questioning of the classical democratic image. One of the most vital legitimating mechanisms of bourgeois democracy was losing its hold: voters were questioning the viability of the electoral process by simply not going to the polls, voting ritualistically, or suggesting that their votes were worthless. Though this did not necessarily mean troubled times for the elite, it carried the probability of more difficult problems in the future. More troubling was the possibility that the electoral process might become discredited as a means for changing American society, leading subordinate class members to illegitimate and extra-institutional means for changing the system. Consequently, most of the Foundation’s efforts in political sociology during this time were directed toward pragmatic understanding of American political behavior and the construction of a revised democratic theory to replace the idealistic and seemingly outdated classical view. 

The effort to restructure political science required a substantial financial investment. During the crucial decade of the 1950s, it was the Ford Foundation which played the key role in supporting the behavioral sciences. Between 1951 and 1957 the Behavioral Science Division granted over $23,000,000 in support; this was clearly the largest investment made by any institution, including the Federal Government. For a period of time grant money from private foundations was the only source of funds. 

This situation gave Ford (and other foundations) tremendous leverage in shaping the behavioral social sciences around empirical problems. As Behavioral Science Division head Bernard Berelson pointed out, the Foundation was not interested in supporting academic disciplines for their own sake. 

The foundations have always been interested in improving man’s estate, and from the beginning they hoped for and wanted practical returns that could be directly applied to the solution or amelioration of human problems.3 (emphasis added) 

The Foundation’s support for the behavioral revolution thus was part of its more general effort to insure that the behavioral sciences would succumb to “liberal practicality” in the post World War II era.4 Political scientists were encouraged to do empirical research rather than dealing with overriding theoretical or normative issues. 

To accomplish this dramatic transformation of the field, the Foundation concentrated on building an institutional structure which would insure victory for the behavioralists. This required involvement at a number of different levels: support for individual scholars and creation of academic “stars” within disciplines; grants to elite universities, research institutes, and new “think tanks”; shaping of professional journals (American Political Science Review, American Sociological Review, Journal of Politics) and even the creation of new journals (Behavioral Science); domination of intermediary research clearinghouses such as the Social Science Research Council5; and promotion of behavioral science techniques, especially survey research.

Teacher standing in front of classroom, speech bubble: “…Oh, and one more announcement: All the material used in this class was brought to you by the Ford Foundation…”; on the chalkboard behind the professor: “Behavioralism Functionalism Pol.Sci 350"
Illustration by Beverly Chorbajian

 The Behavioral Revolution 

The behavioral revolution in political science succeeded on a number of levels. For example, the results of a 1962 survey6 of American political scientists clearly demonstrated the extent of the change: “comparative government” and “political behavior” were listed as areas in which the most significant work was taking place, rather than the more traditional areas of “public law” and “political theory.” Also, the political scientists most frequently identified as making the most important contributions to the field since World War II were all behavioralists: Robert Dahl, Harold Lasswell, Herbert Simon, David Truman, and V.O. Key. 

Another indicator of the success of the behavioral revolution has been the control of the American Political Science Association presidency. From 1927 when Charles Merriam (an early proponent of behavioralism) was elected president, until 1950, none of the presidents were prominently identified as advocates of the behavioral approach. However, with the election of Peter Odegard in 1950, no fewer than six of the political scientists who have been chosen president of the association have also served on the (Ford Foundation funded) Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Political Behavior. Moreover, of the 23 presidents from 1950 to 1973, at least 13 are generally identified as behavioralists.7 Behavioralists have thus been able to show disproportionate strength in professional activities.

The impact of the postwar behavioral revolution in political science is also evident in the age distribution of members in various subfields. In the newer behavioral specializations (such as political psychology; political socialization; methodology; judicial, legislative and voting behavior; revolution and violence; and empirical theory), more than 70% of the respondents in a 1967 survey were 37 or younger.8 On the other hand, specializations like administrative law, government regulation of business, and personnel administration attract few young people. Traditional political science areas such as normative and historical political theory, constitutional law and political history witnessed a decline while behavioral political science theories and methods established dominance. 

Constraining Alternative Views 

By the mid-1960s, the behavioral approach to political science became firmly entrenched. As a consequence, a “mobilization of bias” prevailed, severely limiting alternative approaches that could challenge behavioralism.9 By definition, traditional political science, constitutional law, political history, and radical political science research were not part of the “new” political science. 

This new perspective stressed survey research as the dominant technique. By narrowing broad political issues to ”technical questions”–such as how people vote, what increases allegiance to the prevailing value system, and how to increase voter turnout-the Foundation indirectly imposed a framework which delimited challenges to the fundamental underpinnings of these issues. Alternative frameworks which located the same problems on a structural level and suggested broader historical or class-based analyses were deemed inappropriate. 

Rather than adopting an alternative theory grounded in a Marxist framework, the opposition took the form of a fragmented perspective which accepted the terms of the debate established by behavioralist methodology. The limitation of the debate to questions suggested by liberal political theory is testimony to the fact that the prevailing liberal ideology was able to shape even the form of its opposition.10 The importance of setting limits to debate would suggest again that a very powerful influence on academic research occurs at the early stages when the scope of legitimate research projects is being defined. 

Thus a narrow pragmatic orientation became prominent, and continues to focus ever more exclusively on policy questions, while excluding other perspectives as too broad or too philosophical. 

Although there is clearly a circulation of elites within the profession, the data suggest a rather stable and relatively homogenous “learned discipline” whose principle concern is with American political phenomena and whose preferred mode of inquiry is behavioral.11 

Contradictions in Social Control 

From the perspective of the Ford Foundation officials, the perceived problems were those of increasing social strain, indexed by voter apathy, worker dissatisfaction, and more visible demonstrations such as protest movements. Insofar as the Foundation was concerned, the root cause of these problems was one of inadequate communications. Thus the Foundation embarked on a series of programs to redefine social norms and ideology, while supporting extremely limited social reforms.12

In place of programs which might encourage genuine political participation by the citizenry, the Ford Foundation tried to develop new justifications for the social order. The hidden agenda of its involvement in political science during this period was an attempt to restructure the field so that political scientists would adopt a harmonious perspective. In the Foundation’s view, a “new” political science would contribute to the effort of stabilizing a social structure which was experiencing “disequilibrium due to social disorganization.” The Foundation defined the problems of this era as the product of an outdated ideology; it sought therefore through redirection of a part of academia to reestablish ideological hegemony rather than fundamentally restructure social institutions. 

The problems facing American society, however, were not simply those of communication. Structural contradictions in the system threatened to produce alternative definitions of reality which challenged the dominant framework.13 Piecemeal attempts at reform and reorganization of political science were short term steps which were inadequate because the problem was much more deeply rooted in the contradictions of capitalist society. These approaches were not able to effectively reestablish order either in the community or academia. 

Even the most influential private foundations cannot anticipate successfully the challenges which emerge within the larger society. The Ford Foundation’s efforts reflect the contradictions which it was trying to overcome. At first glance it appears that it was successful, but closer examination reveals that it could neither establish effective control over the social forces within the community or, for that matter, prevent opposition to the perspective which it supported in political sociology. 

This case study of Ford Foundation involvement in political science illustrates the way Ford, and similar foundations, shape the development of research in areas critical to the corporate elite. Crucial to this process is foundation ability to create academic “stars,” influence intermediary funding organizations, develop think tanks, and build university programs. Although the Ford Foundation’s mechanisms of control have become increasingly subtle and unobtrusive as the institutional base–which it was instrumental in establishing–matured and gained some autonomy, its influence continues because it shaped the larger environment in which research programs operated. Even the publications (which were produced from its early grants) have come to define conventional political sociology. Ultimately, then, this ability to build institutions and dominate the networks involved in the production of knowledge allowed the Ford Foundation both to set the agenda for social science research in the United States and enlist the social sciences in the struggle to promote social stability.

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References

  1. Ford Foundation, Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program, New York: Ford Foundation, 1949, pp. 64 and 67-78.
  2. anomie: a state of society in which normative standards of conduct have weakened or disappeared.
  3. Bernard Berelson, “The Place of Foundations,” paper delivered at the American Sociological Association meetings, 1960.
  4. The term liberal practicality comes from C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
  5. Between 1956 and 1969 the Ford Foundation granted the Social Science Research Council $23.5 million, which accounted for roughly 72% of its outside revenues. Administration of the very important Ford-created Foreign Area Fellowship Program was also turned over to the Council.
  6. Albert Somit and Joseph Tannenhaus, “Trends in American Political Science,” American Political Science Review, vol. 62, May 1963, pp. 933-947.
  7. Austin Ranney, “The Committee on Political Behavior 1949-1964,” Social Science Research Council, Items, Sept. 1974, p. 39.
  8. Heinz Eulau and James G. March (ed.), Political Science, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969, p. 81.
  9. The concept of the mobilization of bias is discussed by E.E. Schattschneider in The Semi-Sovereign People, New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1960. Also see P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, “The Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review, vol. 56, December 1962, pp. 947-952 and Steven Lukes, Power–A Radical View, New York: Humanities Press, 1975.
  10. Goran Therborn, “What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?”, The Insurgent Sociologist, vol. VI, no. III, Spring 1976, p. 3.
  11. Walter Roettger, “Strata and Stability of Reputations of American Political Scientists,” Political Science, vol. 4, Winter 1978, p. 10.
  12. Social and political change presided over by ruling elites was labeled by Gramsci as “passive revolution.” See “Notes on Italian History” in Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publishers, 1971
  13. For a discussion of the contradictory consciousness generated in a capitalist society, see Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, chapter 3, and also Gramsci, Prison Notebooks.